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ABSTRACT
Communities in cities were transformed significantly in the second half of the twentieth
century. Weaker social ties and growing individualism have been combined with the
growing role of formal institutional structures. Local governments became increasingly
dominated by central structures. Decentralisation emerged as an attempt to reform this
tendency. This article presents and analyses district councils in Poznan in respect of
their success in promoting public involvement, accountability, and efficiency of public
services delivery. It is argued that their impact on accountability, public control of
authority, public involvement, and public activity is not significant. Instead, growing
distrust of district councillors towards the city can be observed. Moreover, despite
certain minor differences in administration costs, the structure of districts’ expenses is
relatively homogeneous which may lead to the conclusion that district councils do not
help to adjust the services to the varied inhabitants’ preferences. 
1. INTRODUCTION – COMMUNITIES AND 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS IN CITIES 
Communities in cities, treated as distinctive units with specific characteristics,
started to be the object of intensive research since the Chicago School made
them a central focus of investigation. Park, Burgess and others used the term
“natural area” to depict more or less homogeneous units within cities.
Communities attracted a lot of scholarly attention, focused on social
Piotr Matczak*
DISTRICT COUNCILS – BETWEEN COMMUNITY
AND ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF POZNAN1
* Institute of Sociology, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland.
1. The collection of data analysed in the paper was sponsored by a grant obtained from the
Social Science Faculty, Adam Mickiewicz University, and a grant from the City of Poznan. Help
from workers of the Office of the City of Poznan is gratefully acknowledged. Catherine
Murray read the manuscript, offered valuable comments and corrected the language.
6. MATCZAK/2  27-06-07 13:47  Σελίδα 137
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 03:29:37 |
PIOTR MATCZAK
fragmentation; on various types of spatial behaviour; on social construction of
communities; on the role of physical design etc. The key issue in the research
has been the relation between physical dimension and communal life. The
Chicago School tradition concentrated mostly on the spontaneous aspect of
social behaviour. Institutions were also taken into consideration as a product
of voluntary action. The emphasis was on neighbourhoods, self-assistance
activities, social control, and grassroots organisations. Nevertheless, the formal
institutions play an increasingly important role in the life of city communities.
Their growing importance can be attributed to the neo-Keynesian policies,
with the increase of the top-down delivered welfare in the developed countries.
The strengthening of cities’ administration was connected with the evolution of
communities. As a result, today’s communities are to a large extent, shaped by
the formal institutions. Moreover, local governments, which for a long time
could be treated as a representative of communities, are under profound
transformation. They lose their power and legitimacy. These two processes are
intertwined and contribute to the fading of local life. 
This article focuses on this double process based on the case of Poznan.
District councils in Poznan are presented as an attempt of decentralisation,
and they are evaluated in terms of their success in promoting public
involvement, accountability, and efficiency of public services delivery. 
2. COMMUNITIES IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
Many communities studied in the first half of the twentieth century were in
the process of transformation. The change accelerated and the recent shape
of urban communities posed the question of their very existence. Local
proximity, the spirit of community, territorial ties, shared values and norms,
social control, social integration and other characteristics typically attributed
to a community were questioned (Fischer, 1981; Giddens, 1990). Although
M. Stein’s diagnosis of the eclipse of community was criticised as too
radical, many authors diagnose fundamental changes in the nature of a city’s
communities (Stein, 1960; Wellman and Leighton, 1979). Two main factors
were indicated as responsible for these changes. 
Firstly, the impact of economy is marked. Changes of the labour market
and employment type (as well as unemployment) brought individualism,
which was always attributed to urban life. However, it reached an intensity
that undermined the very sense of community (Chandler, 2000). It is a
widely accepted fact, that societies have become increasingly individualized.
Coleman (1993) claims primordial social relations, based on family and
138
6. MATCZAK/2  27-06-07 13:47  Σελίδα 138
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 03:29:37 |
DISTRICT COUNCILS - BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND ADMINISTRATION
community ties, have been vanishing. Beck (1992) considers individua-
lisation as a mark of modernity and Giddens (1990) observes territorial
disembeddedness of individuals’ activities. 
Secondly, in the cultural context, the concept of mass society describes
the decline of communal ties, and emergence of a new, only physical role of
space (Vidich and Bensman, 1958; Sampson, 1988). 
Although links to working places and interest groups caused an erosion of
local ties, studies have shown, that community life does not disappear, rather
its character changes (Crow and Allan, 1994; Wellman and Leighton, 1979). 
The changing shape of a city’s community, connected with broader
socio-economic evolution, broadened the amount of services delivered by
the welfare state, hence leading to the expansion of bureaucracy. The impact
of economic activities on urban life, bringing unemployment, the necessity
to commute, etc. increased the scope of regulatory policies. 
As a result of the state’s growing role, the self-reliance of communities has
weakened (Bridger and Luloff, 1999). Communities transformed into territorial
associations of consumers. The supply side of services became dominant. This
process was connected to the shrinking role of local governments, which
traditionally represented the internal interests of a community.   
3. CHANGES ON THE ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL 
OF COMMUNITIES 
On the organisational level, important changes occurred since the 1960s.
Coulson (2004) argues that in the 1960s, a dual polity still existed. The
central government was busy with national and international spheres, while
local issues were left to local governments. In the 1960s and 1970s a wave of
reforms changed the Western governmental systems. The reforms were
based on a neo-Keynesian approach, with the aim of dealing with market
failures. Decentralised and de-concentrated administrative functions were
common. Also planning, evaluation of performance and other managerial
approach tools were introduced to governing practice. These were still
basically Weberian-type reforms. A new approach appeared in the 1980s,
with the increased popularity of a free market “mood”. The new public
management introduced an entrepreneurial approach towards local public
administration (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  
Managerial-type changes of a government, coupled with the globalised
growth of economies, undermined the capacity of the political and admini-
strative systems to control their performance. This process of hollowing out
139
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the state (Rhodes, 1994) includes growing international interdependences
and decentralization. It produces multi-level governance, where negotiated
exchanges between different institutional levels of governance prevail. Also
the hierarchical command and control approach does not work, while
bargaining can work without predefined legal or constitutional framework
(Peters and Pierre, 2001). As a result one can see interpenetration of
neighbourhoods, local, regional, national, and international level. Many
interliked actors pursue their interest without one dominant power. As a
result, the very ability to effectively govern is questionable and co-operative
forms of governing are emerging. Governance describes the new situation is
based on network management, where public and private interests intervene
(So/ rensen, 2002). Moreover, it often operates beyond formal local
government structures. As a result, one can argue, that the fundamentals of
the communities organisation are substantially altered.2
4. THE CRISIS OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY
The changes of the operations and formal institutions’ functions on the local
level are combined with a transformation of local communities, which
altogether can be treated as an overall crisis of local communities and local
democracies. First, low interest in public life is widely observed. Research by
Fenwick and Elcock (2004) on perception of local political representatives
in four British local councils, shows a low turnout in local elections and lack
of interest from citizens. Blanc and Beaumont (2005) present a case of
formal ‘neighbourhood democracy’ failure in Denmark, where the
introduction of local executive housing committees collapsed because
tenants did not take part in elections. Fenwick and Elcock (2004) conclude
that people are not interested in the structure of public management unless it
is of their direct interest. 
Second, public life started to be occupied by a partisan type of involvement.
In Britain, France, Denmark and other countries in the last 30 years, political
parties penetrated the local political life. As a result, for a person involved in a
public issue, a typical way to a local council is through membership to a
political party. Domination of political parties in the local public scene
140
2. Despite ambiguities connected with governance we can notice that in the context of
sustainable development governance is treated as flexible and encouraging public participation. 
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undermines grassroots civic activities. At the same, time politicians are
motivated by opportunism, which permeates local life (Papadopoulos, 2003).
Third, the position of executive powers in local settings is weak and
unstable. The competences and the legal (electoral) solutions cause, in many
cases, a situation, where decision making is a complicated procedure.
Additionally, the political system promotes a stronger private sector (e.g. in
health care) and marginalises the local councillors and local activists
(Coulson, 2004).
Fourth, there is a significant decline of representation. Local politicians
can promise little, because the results of their actions and policies are
dependant on other levels of power and on other actors. As a result,
representation is not connected to the elections and representative
democracy, but to the perceived right to represent. Local officers and elected
members are confused with the representativeness of their partners. The loss
of representativeness is a serious danger to the functioning of elected bodies.
As a remedy, public participation is widely accepted. However, Chandler
(2000) criticises the idea of public involvement, which gives socially skewed
results and leads to the promotion of certain lobby groups. Similarly, Blanc
and Beaumont (2005) are sceptical about the idea of deliberation – which can
be superficial and not efficient. Not only does the low level of turnout cause
the weakening accountability of authorities against voters, but networks in
the form of cliques, substitute government. This jeopardises transparency and
accountability (Rhodes, 2000). Such blurred form of representation calls into
question the legitimacy of power. Weak legitimacy, where lack of protests is
a simple sign of legitimate action, prevails in local authorities. 
Fifth, the government’s capacity for delivering services is restricted.
Bailey (2001) attributes crisis in local governance to a new, post-welfare era.
The failure to manipulate the demand, the growing interdependence between
countries, the growth of the quantity of local services delivered by the local
governments, combined with decentralisation and market-driven mechanisms
reinforce local governments’ inability to guarantee their obligations. This
leads to a “withdrawal” postulate and governance is a method used by
authorities, to escape from obligations that are impossible to comply with. 
Sixth, bureaucracy plays the role of an independent political actor, as it is
able to mobilize resources as an active actor in elections. 
The drawbacks mentioned above, highlight the peculiar situation of local
democracy. The lack of interest and low turnout does not bring information
from citizens on their preferences. As a result polices produce suboptimal
effects, there is lack of proper allocation, and costs of services’ delivery are
141
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high. For Papadopoulos (2003) current governance networks not only bring
into question the content of polices, but also the process. Bailey (2001)
emphasises resistance to adaptation. For instance, it is hardly possible to
cancel a service if it is against the interests of politicians and bureaucrats. 
4.1. Decline of local government or revival 
According to some authors, the changes in local life are symptoms of a
serious problem – they diagnose the decline of local democracy (Ashworth,
Copus and Coulson, 2004; Blanc and Beaumont, 2005). Low election
turnouts, lack of trust in politicians and the political process, a climate of
cynicism and political disengagement leaves no space for the dual polity –
where central government leaves space to local governments (Coulson,
2004). Cochrane (2004) downgrades the role of local government, which is
neither the crucial link between central government and the local
communities, nor has it a distinctive role as the most legitimate expression
of the local communities’ will. For Cochrane, it is just an element of the
governance structure network.
Despite the above mentioned difficulties, some authors are more
optimistic. Wollman (2004) studying changes of local governments in
Germany, France, Sweden, and England notices significant differences
between countries concerning local government, yet he identifies a general
trend towards decentralisation, and the enhancement of local political
leadership and the strengthening of democratic and deliberative forms of
participation. Bogason (2003) notices a similar situation in Denmark.
Growing influence of local inhabitants, as end users, appears in the form of
participation in boards of directors, and advisory boards. 
5. REFORMS OF LOCAL DEMOCRATIC SPHERE 
Facing these difficulties, there are proposals to recover democratic
governance on the local level. Bailey (2001) pinpoints at two main
directions of reform: (a) reforms focused on the demand side; and (b) on the
supply side. Although he sees a higher potential on the supply side, he also
shows some consideration for efforts on the demand side. 
5.1. Demand side reforms
Following the public choice school, Bailey (2001) is sceptical about
possibilities to manipulate demand. However, there is space for improvement
in this area, in terms of detecting better information on demand. Low
turnout, which is the prevalent situation, does not transmit information on
142
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citizens’ expectations. As a result, it is difficult to change the quality of
services in order to adjust it to demand, or to detect demand for new services. 
As a second best option, referendums can reveal demand. Also,
informing citizens on the issues at hand can produce refined demand.
Deliberative techniques, aiming to deliver information on all matters can be
very expensive and time consuming. This applies also to citizens who usually
trust decision makers or, withdraw from interest in public life. Nevertheless,
it is accepted that disseminating information can be helpful in any case. 
A weaker method of getting information about preferences is to rely on
leaders’ opinions. Leadership can help to bring “hidden” preferences to light
(e.g. oppressed minorities, “silent majority” etc.). 
Bogason (2003) argues, that after 1980 citizens started to be more
independent, and new influence channels emerged in three forms. The first is
the “ad hoc democracy” where local activists, who are not devoted to
maximize their individual preferences work for the common good, and co-
operate with neighbours. In Denmark, local entrepreneurs appeared, “the
every day makers” (Bang and So/ rensen, 1999), who are active in running
local projects based on grants, and often establish organizations. The second
form of influence is the “user democracy” appearing as, for instance,
participation of inhabitants in boards of directors of local service delivery
corporations (it can lead, however, to local corporatism). The third form
distinguished by Bogason is the “associational democracy” emphasizing the
growing role of NGOs influencing the public sector. 
Bogason takes a realistic perspective on his description of local democratic
life. He argues that a traditional voter exists, but loses interest and relies on
traditional political parties. These voters are relatively passive participants in
local life, close to “clients” who are just users of communal services. On the
other extreme, there are “activists”, who are the equivalent of businessmen in
the public sphere; these are the “members of associations”. Diversification of
participation in public life, as observed by Bogason, is the consequence of
fragmentation of local government and local services delivery.
5.2. Supply side reforms
On the supply side, reforms are focused on two issues: improvement of the
performance of the local bureaucracy, and decentralisation. In the former
case, several controls on bureaucracy are applied, within a managerial
scheme, such as audits, performance checking etc. Another method is to
build a competitive environment, which aims at efficiency. Mandatory
tendering procedures are also applied within this approach. 
143
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Decentralisation is probably the most often discussed measure in the
context of coping with several weaknesses of local democracy, although there
are also proponents of consolidation. Swianiewicz (2002) lists several
arguments in favour of the consolidation process. First of all, bigger units
have the advantage of economies of scale. Second, bigger units can deal
better with spill over effects (individuals use local infrastructure but live
elsewhere and do not bear the cost). Third, interest groups can be stronger,
and participation more developed in bigger municipalities, since they can
provide diversified functions that can generate more public interest. Fourth,
civic life can grow in conditions less prone to nepotism in a pluralistic
context that can develop as a big diverse unit. 
These arguments are resisted by supporters of localism, who advocate
fragmentation. Localism suggests devolving power and resources from
central control and shift it to local democratic structures (Ashworth, Copus
and Coulson, 2004). Arguments for fragmentation include the following
advantages: possibility for citizens for “voting with the feet” if they are
dissatisfied; higher level of accountability; higher level of trust in public
authorities; better adjustment to inhabitants’ preferences; motivation of
inhabitants to participate in public life; less bureaucracy. It is also argued
that more units in a given territory can produce more innovations and
measures to attract investment. 
Programs strengthening accountability, and participation are advocated
by proponents of decentralisation. For Cowell (2004) the possibility to get
the public involved and getting information on their preferences are the
crucial aspects of decentralization. Fenwick and Elcock (2004) propose new
arrangements that combine better management and greater public
involvement. Participation should be linked with a new role for the local
authority as ‘community leader’, facilitating the local debate and detecting
needs of consumers, communities, and city managers. Blanc and Beaumont
(2005) focus on a successful example of a development policy based on
participation - the district of Kreutzberg in Berlin. In the 1980s a program
to improve the standard of dwellings was introduced, based on the decision
of inhabitants, who would participate in improving their own dwellings or
agreed to pay a higher rent. 
The discussion on decentralisation is far from conclusive. Contradictory
developments can be observed among different countries. France is an
example of a traditionally fragmented local government, while in Britain and
the Nordic countries larger units were introduced in the last 20-40 years. 
144
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6. THE CASE OF DISTRICT COUNCILS IN POZNAN 
6.1. The Polish case in context
Outside Anglo-Saxon countries, centralisation is treated as being close to
autocracy. Such a view is even more common in post-communist countries.
Polish local governments share some features of the western countries
mentioned above, but show some major differences too. Obviously,
similarities can be found between local government in Poland and in other
post-communist countries. 
In Central and Eastern European countries, local government existed only
in a superficial form, during the communist era. It was practically a part of the
centralised administration ruled by the communist party that froze
spontaneous local community life. 
In Poland, research conducted in the 1980’s (and earlier) gives a gloomy
picture of  local life under the centralised regime (Starosta, 1995; Jalowiecki,
1989). Local government was reintroduced in 1990 as a legal body in a
fundamental constitutional change. Decentralisation took the form of giving
real power to the local governments and the functional reform, based on the
subsidiarity principle. The first elections, in 1990, brought into power new
councillors, mostly without any previous experience in public life, although
many of them were involved in the anticommunist opposition activities
during the 1980s. The re-establishment of local governments brought a wave
of enthusiasm and creativity. Contrary to Hungary, the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic, in Poland there was no territorial decentralisation.
In communist countries, there was a wave of consolidation in the 1970’s.
It was in accordance with the general belief, within the communist doctrine,
in economies of scale (Swianiewicz, 2002). In Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Poland and Bulgaria the number of local governments was reduced. At the
beginning of the 1990s’ this process was reversed. In Hungary, the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic the number of local government units
increased. In Poland and in Bulgaria, new fragmentation was operated to a
much lesser extent. 
Presently, in most of Central and East European countries local govern-
ments are relatively small: more that 50% of all local governments in the
Czech Republic, 40% in Slovakia, and 15% in Hungary are units with less than
500 inhabitants. In Poland the average population of a municipality is 16. 000;
35. 000 in Bulgaria  and 66. 000 in Lithuania (Swianiewicz, 2002).
145
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6.2. Satisfaction with local government in Central and East European
countries 
In some countries in Central Europe municipalities are very small, which is in
accordance with the accountability postulate but leads to difficulties in the
provision of public services. Swianiewicz’s (2001) research on inhabitants’
satisfaction with local government performance shows a negative correlation
with size, except the smallest municipalities in the Czech republic (smaller
than 500) and in Hungary (smaller than 1.000). The highest satisfaction with
services is expressed in municipalities between 2.000 and 10.000 inhabitants. 
Spending per capita for administration can be used as an indicator of
efficiency. In terms of financial efficiency, a negative correlation can be
observed with the size of units: in smaller units the proportion of spending
on administration is higher (Swianiewicz, 2002). The same applies to the
relationship between the size of municipalities and the turnout in local
elections: the smaller the unit, the higher the turnout. This can serve as a
partial confirmation of the zero sum game between economic efficiency and
democratic accountability. 
6.3. District councils 
Changes that started in Poland in 1989 were based on the belief, that strong
local government is one of the democratic values of a new political system.
The new law on local government, passed in 1990, was prepared within a
democratisation and decentralisation spirit. It intended to remove the
obstacles for local activities and self-governing. New legislation aimed at
opening the space for local activity and creativity. 
In this spirit, a measure included in the new law provided the possibility
to establish sub-local councils. These were not meant to be new legal bodies,
but elements of the existing local governments. In rural areas it is rather an
obvious idea, since there is a long tradition of villages’ self-governing, which
survived even through communist times. In this respect, the law gave a way
for the introduction (or sustenance) of parish councils with village heads,
elected by a community. 
In urban areas, the situation is quite different, since district councils were
rather  a novelty. In the communist period, local organisations of the
centralised political and administrative system were established. They were
present more often in bigger cities, in the form of “block committees”. In
1962 there were 10 684 block committees in Poland, with more than 80
thousand activists (Ciesãla, 1971). They were weak, with limited consultative
146
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competences. Their performance was criticised even during those times.
Moreover, in many cases, inhabitants’ co-operatives played a role of local
territorial “self-government”. 
The decentralisation spirit of the beginning of 1990s introduced the idea
of implementation of sub-local councils in the cities. Given a very general
statement in the law, city councils could adopt two different approaches. In
about half of Polish cities the top-down approach was adopted - the city
councils divided the territories, prepared a legal framework (including the
elections procedure), organized elections and established district councils.
Other cities took a bottom-up approach, “offering” to inhabitants the
possibility to establish a district council and to organise elections when the
local initiative appeared (ZMP, 1996). 
After 15 years, the picture of district councils and their performance is not
clear. Chmielnicki (2002) and Maczynski (2002) suggest that the general
character of the legal provision causes ambiguity about their role and
competences. Authors recognise poor performance of district councils due to
the vagueness of the law. Also, representatives of city offices express
dissatisfaction with the present shape of district councils. From the point of
view of city administrations, the units are “trouble makers”. They are difficult
to coordinate, demanding supervision, while bringing little “value added”.  
6.4. District councils in Poznan 
Poznan is situated in west-central Poland; with its 560 000 inhabitants and a
territory of 262 km2 it is one of the biggest cities in Poland, and the capital of
a province (Wielkopolska). The process of district council creation was
initiated in Poznan just after the new local governments were re-established in
1990; in 1991 the first district council was elected. They constantly grew and
by 2003 there were 65 units (Table 1). Currently, most of the city’s territory is
covered by districts, except some suburbs with lower population density.
Some districts were established through the division of bigger ones. Also,
within the last years in some units there was shortage of candidates for
elections, and elections had to be postponed. In most districts councillors are
voted by ballot. In the five smallest units there is a general assembly model
used, and candidates are proposed and voted at the meeting. 
Districts in Poznan vary enormously in size. The smallest have some
hundred inhabitants and the biggest more than 30 thousands. The types of
buildings within each district can also be differentiated: there are districts
mostly with detached houses, districts with a mixture of modern blocks of
flats and 100 years old tenement houses. There are also districts with mixed
types of buildings.  
147
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The majority of Poznan inhabitants have little awareness of district
councils. Moreover the district councils are often misunderstood and treated
as the administrative bodies of building co-operatives, which is a legacy from
the communist era, when the two were  conflated.
There is no special area of competence set in legislation for these
districts. The law leaves space for local initiatives, within the scope of the
competence of local governments. The financial resources of the district
councils come from the city councils, counted in the poll tax mode. The level
is decided yearly by the city council. It is low, however. For example in 2003
the district councils had 0,23% of the whole city budget.3 District councils
plan their expenses one year in advance, and these expenses are included in
the city budget. There is a growing difficulty with the very process of
spending the money. Since district councils do not have a legal status, the
tendering procedure has to be done by the city council. This bypasses the
148
3. There are cities where the proportion is even smaller – for example in Kalisz, a city of
110 thousand inhabitants in central Poland, it was 0,04% in 2003.
Year of Number of district councils
establishment established
1991 1
1992 9
1993 9
1994 8
1995 5
1996 5
1997 4
1998 2
1999 6
2000 9
2001 7
2002 0
2003 0
Total 65
TABLE 1
Number of district councils established in Poznan
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councillors. Moreover, increasingly city administration takes a lead in the
execution of projects prepared by the districts. Certain activists criticize this
practice, since they lose control and the feeling of participation. 
In 2000, a new financing scheme was introduced for district councils in
the form of grant competition. Applications are proposed by the district
149
4. The allocation of expenses to particular budget sections is a not entirely precise.
Sometimes councils change the title of expenses, moving it to another section. The scale of such
shifts is difficult to evaluate. For the present analysis the data are taken for granted. 
Budget section Example of actions Average
(1999-2002) 
10   Agriculture “Green Poznan” 
competitions for gardeners 3 435
600 Transportation  Pavement and road 
and communication reconstruction and maintenance 60 784
630 Tourism Tours for pupils; organisation  
of bike tours; organisation 
of tours for elderly 3 367
750 Administration Office, travel reimbursement etc. 119 839
754 Public security Co-financing monitoring systems;
and fire protection co-financing “Safe Poznan” program 3 003
801 Education Equipment for schools; 
school competitions 43 079
853 Social welfare Help to disadvantaged families; 
help to children from poor families 15 966
854 Educational Equipment for kindergartens, 
activities day-rooms for pupils, sponsoring 
additional activities for pupils 46 112
900 Public utilities Cleaning, sustaining green areas,
and services light for parks 63 569
921 Culture and Meetings, special events, donations
national heritage to community centres 64 613
926 Sport Building and reconstruction 
of sport fields; sport events 90 761
TABLE 2
Types of expenses4 of Poznan’s district councils (in EURO: 1 EURO = 4 PLN)
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councils and a jury, consisting of the city’s administration representatives
and representatives of the district councils, chooses the best ones. The
amount of money spent this way was marginal in comparison to the city
budget, but significant compared to the total budget of the district councils,
accounting for one third of it. One of the reasons the grant system was
invented was to promote cooperation among districts. However, few
proposals were prepared as joint initiatives. The majority of grants were
spent within the sport and recreation sector. 
6.5. Research questions, methodology and data
Despite important differences, the post-communist countries face similar
problems to Western democracies. Decentralisation requires balancing
efficiency improvements by economies of scale, which implies bigger units,
and better representation, which implies smaller ones. 
In this paper the district councils in the city of Poznan are taken into
consideration and treated as a measure applied to cope with weaknesses of
urban communities and local governments. It is investigated, whether this
solution strengthens the accountability of public authorities, and efficiency
of public service delivery. 
Poznan is representative of cities where district councils are created with
the bottom up approach, as an inhabitants’ initiative. There is very limited
data collected on the system of district councils in Poland. Poznan is
assessed, as a city where the districts operate well, compared to other cities
(Wiatr et al., 2003).  
The expenses of district councils in Poznan between 1999 and 2002 were
taken as a primary body of data. Additional data were gathered on turnout in
elections in Poznan; on the grant system; on institutional arrangements
within the councils. Data were collected between November 2003 and April
2004 from existing records and interviews with people responsible for district
councils in the city administration. 145 in-depth interviews were recorded.
7. RESULTS 
Concerning accountability of the district councils system, the functioning of
the election system and engagement of inhabitants was assessed. Another
aspect of accountability is depicted by interactions between district councils
and the city. Analysis of elections show that turnout varies significantly
among districts, the highest level reached was 46% and the lowest 2%. The
average turnout decreases during subsequent elections, from 12,8% in the
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first, 12,5% in the second and 12,1% in the third. Elections are not organized
at the same time for all districts, since the moment of establishment varies
for each district. The city tries to compact the entire time span for elections,
in order to cut costs and to promote elections in one period. Despite such
efforts, the turnout is definitely low.
The interaction between district councils and the city, as another aspect of
accountability, is not smooth. District councilors complain that the city
officers try to avoid consultation with the district councils in the decision
making process. Meanwhile district councilors are perceived as incompetent
expressing narrow views. District councils do not have high trust in public
authorities. Among councilors, especially from small districts, there is a
feeling of distrust towards the city. People in small units have a sense of
locality, and for them informal conduct is an obvious way to conduct
transactions. For them the necessity to follow the city regulations (even if it is
required by law) is treated as an unnecessary burden coming from a
centralistic view of the city’s administration. 
Concerning the motivation for citizens to participate in public life, the
city’s district councils encompass an impressive figure of around one
thousand councilors. Nevertheless, research showed that at least a quarter of
them are not active, and in most cases only a few are involved in the
council’s operations. Moreover, the active councilors are often engaged in
several circles of activities. 
Since 2000,  there was trouble finding enough candidates for elections in
certain councils, which shows that the motivation for participation is not
high. For many councilors the present situation is discouraging, due to
growing complications in the modality of spending money (for example cash
transfers are not allowed and only bank transfers are possible) and reporting
requirements. 
Moreover, in terms of inhabitants’ involvement in public life, the low
electoral turnout supports the view of the disengagement of inhabitants. 
Considering the role of the district council system as a measure to
increase the efficiency of public services delivery, their spending was
analyzed in order to evaluate the impact they are producing in these terms.
Since districts are voluntarily established and vary significantly in size, one
could expect that their expenses should also vary in kind, presumably
reflecting the various preferences. A K-means clustering technique was
applied in order to group districts into distinct types, according to the
different use they are attributing their resources to, i.e. according to the
different type of expenses (Figure 1). This technique produces, for a given
number of clusters, groupings with the maximum possible similarity within
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and the maximum possible dissimilarity among them. Relative values were
used in the calculations in order to standardize expenses. The types of
expenses are listed on the horizontal axis, while on the vertical axis the
percentage attributed to each type of expense is reflected. 
The analysis reveals some variance among the districts, but difference in
types of spending are not very important. Interestingly, the administration
costs show the highest variability among clusters. Cluster one can be called
“self-oriented” since the proportion of administrative expenses is the
highest. Cluster two has the relatively higher proportion of expenses for
sports and education, while cluster three spends more on transportation
facilities (maintenance of roads and pavements etc).  
The analysis shows that the smaller the unit (in terms of their population)
the higher the proportion of spending for administration (Pearson r =  -
0,525, p < 0,001). Thus, the data supports the thesis that decentralization
increases the bureaucratic costs.
152
FIGURE 1
Groups of Poznan’s District Councils according to their type of expenses 
(K-means cluster analysis) 
6. MATCZAK/2  27-06-07 13:47  Σελίδα 152
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 03:29:37 |
DISTRICT COUNCILS - BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND ADMINISTRATION
8. CONCLUSION 
The crisis of urban communities can be observed in Western countries. The
symptoms are a decline of public engagement, weak representation and a
retreat of public bodies from the delivery of social services. These phenomena
are manifest also in Poland and other post-communist countries and the scale
of related problems is large, due to legacies of communist regimes. 
The revival of district councils in cities can be treated as an attempt to
tackle these difficulties. Districts councils are expected to encourage public
engagement, trust in authorities, and accountability. At the same time they
can bring better adjustment of services to inhabitants’ preferences, and lessen
the bureaucracy. The question explored here, based on the example of
Poznan, is how successful this attempt was.
In terms of accountability, the role of the district councils is ambiguous.
The impact of the district councils on the accountability, public control of
authority, public involvement, and public activity is not significant although
the districts encourage some activists to participate in the decision making
processes. The councilors express dissatisfaction with the possibilities offered
by the city, as in the case of administrative requirements connected with
spending money. The activists feel discouraged in their public engagement.   
Participation of inhabitants (measured by the election turnout) is
significant only in the smaller units. However, it is in these units that the
proportion of resources spent on administration costs is the highest. This is
an example of the balance between accountability and efficiency: it is
possible to improve the one only at the expense of the other.  
An important question is whether district councils help to adjust the
city’s services to citizens’ preferences. Despite certain differences
(especially in administration costs) the districts are relatively homogeneous
in terms of spending, which leads to the conclusion that district councils do
not help to adjust services to preferences. It could be regarded as a failure of
the system. The question is, however, why does the adjustment not work?
The first possible answer can be that the needs are relatively homogenous.
As a matter of fact Polish cities have to cope with basic infrastructural
problems, which can result in similarities in spending. Differences between
districts are so acute, however, that the assumption of homogenous
preferences is hardly possible to support. The other possible explanation is
that district councils do not play the role of aggregating and transmitting the
preferences of inhabitants, and this can be explained by an institutional
analysis emphasizing that a specific institutional solution is path dependant,
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relies on former customs, norms and experience. The idea of introducing
district councils in 1990 was mostly ideologically driven. They were created
with the notion that a new quality of public life would have (spontaneously)
emerged. But what materialised in the post-communist era shows that
conduct was related to past experience, and in the communist era public life
was powerless and fake. Moreover, after 1990, district councils obtained
little resources, so there was no fuel for activation. 
District councils evolved and acquired new functions. An issue worth
further attention is what these functions are, since district councils hardly
promote participation and are not efficient in transmitting information on
citizen’s preferences. 
The system of district councils can be assessed in terms of engagement of
inhabitants into city life (and particularly into neighborhood matters).
However, the success in this task has been limited, since the local election
turnout is low and decreasing, while the cost is high. 
District councils were basically meant as a decentralisation mechanism –
or supply side reform. It was intended to give “power to the hands of
inhabitants”. However, citizens widely expressed desinteressement. As a
result the system works like a demand side reform. It provides information
on inhabitants’ preferences through local leaders. The grant system seems
promising, since it can reveal the preferences based on the leaders’ activity.
Paradoxically, in small units, the leaders treat the city with distrust, as an
opposing power, while in bigger units the leaders are hardly representative.
Moreover relying on loosely legitimated leaders necessitates closer control
from the city, which increases transaction costs. 
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